Incentive Mechanism for Continuous Crowd Sensing Based Symmetric Encryption and Double Truth Discovery

Aimed at the problems in continuous crowd sensing,such as the increased privacy requirements,the unreliable perception data collected and the low enthusiasm of users to participate,this paper proposes an incentive mechanism based on symmetric encryption and double-layer truth discovery(SDIM).First,t...

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Autor principal:	XU Miaomiao, CHEN Zhenping
Format:	Artigo
Idioma:	Chinês
Publicat:	Editorial office of Computer Science 2023-01-01
Col·lecció:	Jisuanji kexue
Matèries:	real time incentive mechanism|symmetric encryption|continuous crowd sensing|data reliability assessment|privacy protection
Accés en línia:	https://www.jsjkx.com/fileup/1002-137X/PDF/1002-137X-2023-50-1-294.pdf
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