Regulation through reference prices
We analyze the role of reference prices on competition and welfare in a circular city model where paying prices above a reference negatively affects consumers' utility. Agents interact in a three-stage game. First, a policymaker chooses a reference price; second, firms make their entry decision; fi...
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Artigo |
| Lingua: | Inglês |
| Pubblicazione: |
El Colegio de México, A.C.
2024-02-01
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| Serie: | Estudios Económicos |
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/450 |
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