Computing a Mechanism for a Bayesian and Partially Observable Markov Approach
The design of incentive-compatible mechanisms for a certain class of finite Bayesian partially observable Markov games is proposed using a dynamic framework. We set forth a formal method that maintains the incomplete knowledge of both the Bayesian model and the Markov system’s states. We suggest a m...
में बचाया:
| मुख्य लेखकों: | , |
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| स्वरूप: | Artigo |
| भाषा: | Inglês |
| प्रकाशित: |
Sciendo
2023-09-01
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| श्रृंखला: | International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science |
| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | https://doi.org/10.34768/amcs-2023-0034 |
| टैग: |
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