Can neurological evidence refute free will? The failure of a phenomenological analysis of acts in Libet’s denial of «positive free will»
In a first part of this paper I expound briefly the essential characteristics of free will. The second part deals with the objections of Benjamin Libet, allegedly based on brain-scientific foundations, against «positive free will». The third and main part shows that Libet’s anti-positive-free-will-p...
Guardat en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Espanhol |
| Publicat: |
Universidad Pontificia Comillas
2013-07-01
|
| Col·lecció: | Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica |
| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | https://revistas.upcomillas.es/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/1618 |
| Etiquetes: |
Sense etiquetes, Sigues el primer a etiquetar aquest registre!
|