Pob-CFR: A Population-Based Counterfactual Regret Minimization Approach for Strategy Optimization in Two-Player Zero-Sum Imperfect-Information Games

Sequentialdecision-making under imperfect information is naturally modeled as an extensive-form game, where the Nash equilibrium serves as the predominant solution concept for two-player zero-sum settings. Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a widely used framework for this purpose, iterativ...

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Principais autores:	Lei Zhang, Dingzhong Cai, Xuan Wang
Formato:	Artigo
Idioma:	Inglês
Publicado em:	MDPI AG 2026-06-01
coleção:	Applied Sciences
Assuntos:	decision-making imperfect-information game population evolution training counterfactual regret minimization
Acesso em linha:	https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/16/11/5711
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