The social cost of congestion games by imposing variable delays

In this study, we describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism incurs no additional cost, in contrast to tolls that typically differ from the social cost as expressed...

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Номзүйн дэлгэрэнгүй

Үндсэн зохиолчид:	Josep Díaz, Ioannis Giotis, Lefteris Kirousis, Ioannis Mourtos, Maria Serna
Формат:	Artigo
Хэл сонгох:	Inglês
Хэвлэсэн:	Elsevier 2017-12-01
Цуврал:	ICT Express
Нөхцлүүд:	Congestion games Price of anarchy Coordination mechanisms
Онлайн хандалт:	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405959517301960
Шошгууд:	Шошго нэмэх Шошго байхгүй, Энэхүү баримтыг шошголох эхний хүн болох!