Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality
ABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to bl...
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| Glavni autor: | |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Jezik: | Inglês |
| Izdano: |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
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| Serija: | Manuscrito |
| Teme: | |
| Online pristup: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000300005&lng=en&tlng=en |
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