Side-Channel Attack on ARADI in Non-Profiling Scenarios
ARADI is a low-latency block cipher introduced by the NSA (National Security Agency), designed with consideration for applications in memory encryption. In this study, we present the first results of side-channel attacks on ARADI, exposing its vulnerabilities to physical attacks in a non-profiling s...
שמור ב:
| Principais autores: | , |
|---|---|
| פורמט: | Artigo |
| שפה: | Inglês |
| יצא לאור: |
IEEE
2025-01-01
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| סדרה: | IEEE Access |
| נושאים: | |
| גישה מקוונת: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11071292/ |
| תגים: |
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