Against the conversational model of legal interpretation
The so-called conversational model claims that legal interpretation does not significantly differ from ordinary understanding: both are inferential processes complying with a pattern that can be traced back to Paul Grice’s thesis. This essay seeks to criticize such a claim, showing that the so-calle...
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| 第一著者: | |
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| フォーマット: | Artigo |
| 言語: | Inglês |
| 出版事項: |
Klub Revus
2020
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.5694 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13089/k0oh https://journals.openedition.org/revus/5694 |
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