Bix on the normativity of law
Bix would like to see legal theorists abandon the currently common view that law makes moral claims. He favours instead, an account of law’s normativity along the lines of Hart’s account (and relatedly, Kelsen’s). I argue that in order to make a persuasive case, Bix would need to offer more to those...
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicat: |
Klub Revus
2019
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| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.4738 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13089/k0nv https://journals.openedition.org/revus/4738 |
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