A problem for the unambitious view of legal normativity
In this contribution, I discuss the so-called “unambitious view of legal normativity”, as it is specifically theorised by Brian Bix. While I agree with Bix that legal normativity should not be assumed to be reducible by default to moral normativity, I will argue that the normativity of law cannot be...
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Language: | Inglês |
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Klub Revus
2019
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.4542 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13089/k0nr https://journals.openedition.org/revus/4542 |
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