A Realistic View on Law and Legal Cognition
The author outlines one form of analytical legal realism as the junction of three main theses. According to its first main thesis, interpretive sentences in legal discourse are ascriptive sentences with no cognitive function. According to the second thesis, the law is the set of norms in force, i.e....
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| Auteur principal: | |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Langue: | Inglês |
| Publié: |
Klub Revus
2015
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| Accès en ligne: | https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.3304 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13089/k0ly https://journals.openedition.org/revus/3304 |
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