Market share transparency, signaling and welfare: Cournot and Bertrand
When demand is noisy and firms’ costs are private information, the availability of market share data increases the accuracy of each firm’s information, and it creates incentives for signaling. Taking both effects into account, we find that under quantity competition with a homogeneous good, the avai...
I tiakina i:
| Kaituhi matua: | |
|---|---|
| Hōputu: | Artigo |
| Reo: | Inglês |
| I whakaputaina: |
De Boeck Supérieur
2021
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| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | https://doi.org/10.4000/rei.10977 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13089/jrmb https://journals.openedition.org/rei/10977 |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
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