Phenomenally-grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists
In this paper, I outline a disjunctivist proposal for understanding the intentionality of perceptions and hallucinations within a naïve realist framework. For the case of genuine perceptual experience, naïve realists can endorse a version of the view that their intentionality is phenomenally-grounde...
I tiakina i:
| Kaituhi matua: | |
|---|---|
| Hōputu: | Artigo |
| Reo: | Inglês |
| I whakaputaina: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2022
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| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13089/j0d7 https://journals.openedition.org/phenomenology/984 |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
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