James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on the Weaknesses of Majority Voting: A Triptych

This paper provides a narrative of the different but complementary accounts of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on the weaknesses of simple majority voting. The paper shows that these authors took different paths to reach the same conclusion. Buchanan used his knowledge about Knut Wicksell which...

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Autore principale:	Grandjean, Julien
Natura:	Artigo
Lingua:	Francês
Pubblicazione:	Association Œconomia 2021
Soggetti:	public choice unanimity Buchanan (James) Tullock (Gordon) majority voting logrolling choix publics vote majoritaire échange de vote unanimité
Accesso online:	https://doi.org/10.4000/oeconomia.10780 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13089/iqbl https://journals.openedition.org/oeconomia/10780
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