The axiomatic characterizations of majority voting and scoring rules
The Arrovian framework of social choice theory is flexible enough to allow for a precise axiomatic study of the voting rules that are used in political elections, sport competitions or expert committees, etc. such as the majority rule or the scoring rules. The objective of this paper is to give an a...
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
|---|---|
| বিন্যাস: | Artigo |
| ভাষা: | Inglês |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Centre d’analyse et de mathématique sociales de l’EHESS
2003
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| বিষয়গুলি: | |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | https://doi.org/10.4000/msh.2919 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13089/igip https://journals.openedition.org/msh/2919 |
| ট্যাগগুলো: |
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